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Religious Liberty and Creative Breakthroughs in
American Politics: Roger Williams and James Madison
NEAL RIEMER

Drew University
What is the relationship between the idea of religious liberty and
creative breakthroughs in American politics? My thesis is that the idea
of religious liberty led to the first creative breakthrough in American
politics in the theory and practice of Roger Williams, and that the idea
played an important part in the second creative breakthrough in
American politics in the theory and practice of James Madison;
moreover, I contend that future breakthroughs in American politics
will continue to draw fruitfully from concepts, problems, and activities
in the religious domain.
What is meant by the concept of "creative breakthrough" and of
"politics"? A Creativebreakthroughin politics refers to a significantly
fruitful resolution of a major problem in connection with one or more of
the major interrelated tasks of the discipline of political science. 1
In connection with the breakthroughs to be examined in this article
I shall, initially, identify the problem that called for a breakthrough;
secondly, articulate the theory that addressed itself to the problem;
thirdly, highlight the breakthroughs in their ethical, empirical, and
prudential dimensions; and, finally, highlight the central or significant
role that key religious ideas played in the breakthrough.
1. Roger Williams and the Breakthrough to Religious
Liberty
The troubling problem that faced Williams in seventeenth century
America had been agitating Western thought and practice since at
least the advent of Christianity, and it had become more acute with the
Protestant Reformation: Is it possible to reconcile the dominant ideal
of religious orthodoxy and political order with the facts of religious
diversity, religious persecution, and political conflict? The facts of
religious and political life underscored the realities of disagreement
{primarily but not exclusively between Catholics and Protestants, and
also between Protestants and Protestants) on who possessed the one
true faith. The facts of religious and political life also underscored
religious and political warfare rooted significantly, if not solely, in such
religious disagreement. 2
At the risk of making Williams' position more coherent and
modern than it was, let me develop his related arguments (1) on behalf
of religious liberty, and (2) on behalf of separation of church and
state. 3
Williams makes a religous and moral argument and an historical
and expedient argument on behalf of religious liberty. Williams'
religious and moral argument consists of two main points: first,
persecution is contrary to the spirit, teaching, and deeds of Jesus; and,
second, persecution is hypocritical.
Williams argues that persecution is contrary to the spiritual nature
of Christ's Gospel and Kingdom. Is it not anomalous, Williams deftly
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points out, for Christians-in the name of Christ, the Prince of
Peace-to persecute, to wield the sword, to spill blood, to divide person
against person? Christ himself indicated that disbelievers must be
allowed to live in this world, that their punishment would come in the
next. People should come to God freely, not because of fear of earthly
persecution, punishment, and coercion. Rape of the soul-Williams'
vivid image for religious persecution-is incompatible with God's
message that people be drawn freely to divinity. Enforced uniformity,
Williams holds, ravishes conscience and violates Christ's message.
Williams uses a famous New Testament parable-the parable of
the wheat and the weeds (tares) in Matthew 13-to drive home his
argument. The weeds (that is, the unregenerate, the impure, the
faithless) may grow unmolested among the wheat (the elect) until
harvest time-that is, death. Why? Because the wheat may be endangered by plucking (persecuting) the weeds. At harvest time (Judgment Day) the weeds can safely be gathered and burned; that is, at the
time of judgment day, punishment can safely be meted out. God's battles in this world, Williams insists, must be fought with God's
weapons-God's words-not with swords and prisons, not with
persecution and civil disabilities.
A policy of persecution is malicious, vicious, and counter·
productive; moreover, persecution is hypocritical. Individuals should
not be forced to believe what their consciences forbid them to believe or
to support a church (and beliefs) their consciences do not endorse. In
an imperfect world how can we, Williams asks rhetorically, say we are
godly and, therefore, have the right to persecute the ungodly who
adhere conscientiously to their own beliefs?
In his historical and expedient argument Williams maintains that
religious persecution undermines civil peace, law, and order, as well as
results in grave injury to true believers. He notes the alternating
persecutions of Protestants by Catholics, Catholics by Protestants, and
Protestants by Protestants. He contends that enforced religious conformity destroys the very prerequisites of civilized society, or true
civility-law, order, peace, respect-as well as injures true believers.
He also emphasizes that persecution for cause of conscience has not, in
fact, produced the alleged "good" sought by the persecutors. Religious
uniformity has not been achieved. "Disbelievers" persist. True
believers, moreover, are clearly martyred; and civility is clearly
damaged. On the other hand, Williams argues on the basis of the
historical record that religious liberty is compatible with the teachings
of Jesus and with true civility. This point is more fully developed in
Williams' argument on behalf of separation of church and state.
Oddly, from a modern point of view, Williams' argument is rooted
in the conviction that only one church-state (biblical Israel) ever
possessed the legitimate power to persecute unbelievers. The key
question for Williams in the seventeenth century thus becomes this:
What is the proper conception of church and state since Israel and
Christ?
The church, Williams argues, is spiritual in nature. It is concerned
with souls. The weapons for its rightful defense must also be spiritual.
worldly props, he maintains, would undermine the church. Therefore,

44

a spiritual church can make no use of a secular state for its spiritual
purposes. God, he writes, has not "appointed the civil sword " as a
"remedy" for the sores of His Body and His Church. 4 The church must
be understood as a corporation with an independent existence. Dissent
and division within the church need not endanger the peace of the
political community.
The state is self-sufficient and has peace as its objective. The state
is different in essence from the church. The state existed before corporations or associations and will remain when they are gone. The
state does not need the church in order to preserve peace and order.
The political community does not require enforced religious conformity
for its continuance . The prince , civil magistrate, or state has limited
responsibilities: to preserve peace and order in the political community.
Religious uniformity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for such peace and order. Indeed , when the civil magistrate persecutes
for cause of conscience, he undermines peace and order. The sword
and the prison should not, must not, be used to enforce the alleged one
true religious faith . In brief, matters of religion are to be left to the individual and to God. The practice of religious faith is not to be a matter
of concern to the civil magistrate. Religion is to be placed beyond the
power of the state.
The most creative breakthroughs are breakthroughs along several
fronts-ethical , empirical, and prudential-and are well illustrated by
Williams' religious and political philosophy. Ethically, Williams articulates an admirable philosophy of politics, of how we ought to live
together. He affirms a philosophy of people of different religious faiths
living together-freely,
happily, harmoniously, civilly, orderly,
peacefully, prosperously-in the same political community. For
Williams, in practice, this community is to be a democratic political
community . Religious freedom , the separation of church and state, a
democratic and constitutional polity-these are for Williams preferred
and crucial values . They become more strongly established in political
American practice in the late eighteenth century (with help from
philosopher-statesmen such as James Madison) and provide the basis of
expanded notions of basic rights and republican rule, and thus serve to
ensure a more generous democratic and constitutional regime.
Empirically, Williams articulates a new hypothesis, which would
be a cornerstone for his "lively experiment" in what is later to be called
Rhode Island, and which will (as already noted above) be subsequently
tested more fully in the United States. The new hypothesis was this:
that in the United States people of different religious faiths-enjoying
religious liberty-can in fact live together without the evil effects that
some feared (incivility, immorality, disrespect for law and order, war);
that in fact religious persecution is the great enemy of society, of harmony, of peace, and of prosperity.
Prudentially, Williams makes the judgment that it is wise to ensure
religious liberty and to separate church and state. He does so by calling
attention to the ill-effects, hypocrisy, and illogic of persecution; by acting to limit the abusive power of state in religious matters; and by
establishing legitimate domains of operation for church and state.
Williams, an orthodox Puritan in essentials, does not deny that
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there is only one true faith; but he does emphatically reject the proposition that it is the duty of the ruler of the state to maintain the one true
faith. And he clearly rejects the conventional wisdom at key points.
Those adhering to the conventional wisdom could only believe that
Williams' ethical recommendation on behalf of religious liberty is
outrageous; that his empirical proposition that religious liberty and
political peace are compatible is false; and that his prudential judgment
that religious liberty and separation of church and state are wise is absurd. However, when the decision on behalf of religious liberty is
tested, it works. In time religious liberty becomes enshrined in the
First Amendment as a cardinal and admired value . Religious liberty
serves in fact to advance social harmony. Both religious liberty and
separation of church and state function to protect against the abuse of
religious and political power. The way to democratic and constitutional
pluralism is open.
Let me now turn to James Madison and note how he articulates in
his theory of the extensive republic the second great breakthrough in
American politics. This breakthrough, I will argue, owes a great debt
to Madison's fundamental commitment to religious liberty and separation of church and state, and to his cardinal insight about the link between a multiplicity of religious sects and freedom.
2. James Madison and the Breakthrough to the "Extensive
Republic"
The problem facing Madison and thoughtful Americans in 1787
was this: Is just republican government in a large state possible?
Republican thinkers in America were struggling to avoid being impaled
on either horn of a dilemma: either a despotic empire as a necessity of
government in a large state; or faction, injustice, and weakness as the
inevitable outcome in a confederate republic with major power residing
in the thirteen American states!
The problem was not only theoretical but practical. Patrick Henry
and other anti-federalists-arguing that republican government is
possible only in a small political community-opposed the new constitution of 1787 and the stronger government it created. They could
not lift their sights beyond the loose political confederation of the Articles of Confederation. Alexander Hamilton and John Adams and
other advocates of "high toned" government maintained-before the
adoption of the new constitution-that only an Empire, or a strong central government on the British model, could hold together a political
community as large as the new American nation. Confederations, they
insisted, were notoriously weak and unstable, plagued by faction, and
detrimental to the interests of justice and the common good. Madison's
great contribution was to demonstrate that the conventional
wisdom-the testimony of history and previous political theory-was
wrong. 5
Madison believed that a strengthened federal republic would
enable the nation to cope with matters of national concern and yet
would leave ample powers-and freedom-to the people in the several
states. The new federalism would thus affirm: a unique division of
powers between nation and states; key constitutional prohibitions on
both the nation and the states; the direct operation of federal law on the
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individuals of the nation; a pragmatic and experimental federal system
relying for its success upon a national consensus, a representative
system, separation of powers, a resourceful presidency, and such
organs as the Supreme Court. Madison argued decisively (and here we
come to the heart of his empirical theory of the extensive republic) that
the multiplicity, diversity, and conflict of factional interests, plus their
larger sphere of operations, would diminish the possibility of factional
agreement and unified factional action. Federalism would limit the
spread of factional mischief, and make it difficult for a factional majority
to achieve power. What we today call pluralism would facilitate, not
hinder, the pursuit of the common good. Madison sought in 1787, then
in 1789, in the 1790s, and finally in the 1820s and early 1830s, to make
his theory relevant to the central challenge of reconciling liberty and
large size. His approach called for a keen analysis of the danger facing
republican government, political debate, popular or party protest, and
a willingness to use radical constitutional means to secure necessary
change.
Madison's devotion to religious liberty strengthened both his devotion to constitutionalism and to federalism . This devotion enabled him
to see that the same principle-of the salutary consequences of the
multiplicity of sects-that operated to ensure religious liberty might
also operate (now as the multiplicity of political, economic, and social
interests) to ensure civil freedom . Human wit could, indeed, perceive
that pluralistic diversity might advance freedom without interfering
with civil decorum and harmony. As early as 1785 Madison had
recognized that only a coalition between religious sects could endanger
our religious rights. 6 Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments (1785) testifies to his early great defense of
religious liberty. His success in defeating such assessments was in no
small measure to be attributed to the reality of the beginnings of
religious pluralism in his native Virginia. In 1787 Madison again expressed his worry about a religious sect forming a majority and using
its power to oppress other sects. And he noted that civil as well as
religious rights could be endangered by an oppressive majority . To
Madison the multiplicity of religious sects guarded against such oppression. In the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788 Madison drove
home his point clearly and vigorously. "If there were a majority of one
sect, a bill of rights would be poor protection for liberty. Happily for
the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This freedom
arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and
which is the best and and only security for religious liberty in any society.
For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority
of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest. 7 This idea, I am arguing, was in Madison's mind before, during, and after the writing of the
Constitution. So, too, I am suggesting, was the link between religious
plurality and freedom, on one hand, and economic, political, and social
plurality and freedom on the other. It was an easy step from the value
of religious plurality for freedom to one of Madison's cardinal ideasan idea central to his creative breakthrough in 1787-that the
multiplicity and diversity of political, economic, and social interests
would similarly constitute a safeguard for political freedom.
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Thus Madison's religious convictions carried over into the political
arena. Again, the concern for religious freedom would strike another
great blow for democratic and consitutional government in American
politics.

3. Conclusion
It is I believe no accident that key religious ideas-particularly the
ideas of religious liberty, separation of church and state, religious
pluralism-have
played such a prominent part in creative
breakthroughs in American politics. Moreover, if we look to other
reform movements in American history and politics-anti-slavery,
women 's suffrage, peace, economic reform, anti-discrimination-we
can detect a comparably prominent religious role. Similarly, as we contemplate current and future problems we may well conclude that key
religious ideas will play a prominent part in our efforts to deal with
them. This, I would suggest, is bound to be the case because of the intimate connection between key religious ideas and a more prophetic
politics. In taking key religious ideas seriously-belief in the Divine, in
freedom of conscience, in covenant, in commandments-people in
politics take seriously the gap between religious values and existential
reality. They are, moreover, sensitized to probe both the reasons for
such gaps and what might be done to bridge them. Genuinely creative
breakthroughs in politics are rare, but the two examples treated in this
essay (and the links between religious ideas and other reform
movements hinted at above) suggest that religious liberty and other
key religious ideas will play a significant role in future breakthroughs
in American politics.
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